Free Will Is Not What You Think It Is
Over at brainblogger there was a post recently (Free Will is NOT An Illusion) which argued against the idea that free will is an illusion. The author argues against the idea that all choices and decisions are made by the subconscious mind, that “the brain makes a subconscious decision before it is realized consciously”. He views this as a misguided notion. He focuses on certain experiments which purport to show the illusion of free will, and argues that they either have faulty methodology or that the data are misinterpreted. On this point I will tend to agree with the author, Dr. Klemm. The experiments he mentions alone are not enough for us to put aside long held notions of free will. Dr. Klemm is also spot on in his statements regarding the difficulty of distinguishing between the processes involved in consciousness and what we call the subconscious, and how these relate to decision making. The problem as I see it, is that Dr. Klemm began his whole line of reasoning from the wrong set of assumptions. These assumptions can be implicitly seen in the conclusion he reaches at the close of the article:
“In the real world, subconscious and conscious minds interact and share duties. Subconscious mind governs simple or well-learned tasks, like habits or ingrained prejudices, while conscious mind deals with tasks that are complex or novel, like first learning to ride a bike or play sheet music. Most deliberate new learning has to be mediated by free will, because subconscious mind has not yet had a chance to learn.”
What I see as the fundamental error in this line of reasoning is that it assumes without justification that free will lies in the realm of conscious choices. That a conscious choice IS a free choice. Most sophisticated criticisms of the notion of free will don’t assert that humans lack free will because decisions are unconscious (though this is certainly a piece of the puzzle), but because even the conscious process of decision making, choice, and action are themselves lacking in free will. These theories argue that the conscious experience of making a choice is in fact an epiphenomenon (i.e. – your conscious experience is just along for the ride, a passive observer with no causal influence on resulting action) and that the feeling of will that goes along with your conscious life is just that…a “feeling”.
There are many convergent lines of reasoning in support of these types of arguments; the subconscious decision making process theory is just one. Other lines of reasoning take many varied forms including arguments from physics, biology, psychology, neuroscience, and more nuanced philosophical arguments.
There
are some particularly interesting neurological disorders with implications for free will. One is the famous alien hand syndrome (think Dr. Strangelove), in which people lose the sense of agency associated with one or more body part. Their hand will act with a “mind of its own”, reaching for things the person doesn’t intend to reach for. One hand will move a certain chess piece, while the other moves a different one. Sometimes the hand still under willful control will be used to stop the alien hand from doing things the individual doesn’t want it to do. This condition isn’t all fun and games though, some people who suffer from it will wake up in the middle of the night with their alien hand strangling them. Research into this syndrome has found that there is a particular area in the brain associated with a person’s sense of agency, damage to parts of that area can lead to selective loss of this “sense”.
There’s an even more extreme condition (whose name is failing me right now, if anyone knows, please let me know) where a person loses all sense of agency completely. They will state that they have no control over their actions at all. They make decisions consciously (i.e – they are conscious of decisions), but they feel they have no causal role in these decisions. This is also one of the symptoms of schizophrenia, in which sufferers often have delusions that their actions are being controlled by an external force. Related forms of psychopathology include individuals who hear thoughts in their head which they attribute to other people, as if someone has somehow deliberately inserted a thought in their head, or alternatively forced them to think a certain thought (a slight but very important difference as it shows a distinction between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership).
These cases show us not that there is some sort of distinction to be made about subconscious decisions and conscious decisions in relation to free will, rather that consciousness itself is not a guarantor of free will. As mentioned above, other arguments focus on biology, in particular our genetic makeup. Specifically, how the resultant organism interacts with its environment, how the brain is changed and what constraints it can do this by. These days there is no real nature vs. nurture debate, as it has long ago been accepted that the reality is some mixture of both. Both sides of this coin manifest themselves in the neuronal firing and synaptic connections in the brain. Genes build bodies with certain tendencies and predispositions to act in certain ways based on their neuronal make up. Our experience prunes, strengthens, and builds connections over time. So in essence, all behavior and decision making is the result of some set of initial conditions which have changed over time according to fixed laws. Current decisions are based on our biology and our experience, our past decisions and their results, and in any given instance there is only one possible outcome given the set of inputs.
Bringing it down to a more fine grained level of physical phenomena, where is there room for free will if at root, all behavior is the three dimensional organizational projection of a bunch of atoms, or protons and electrons interacting according to very rigid laws of physics? Each particular atom has no “will” of its own. And yet some very large collection of atoms are supposed be free in some wholly different way? It’s usually at this point where quantum mechanical theories of free will try to sneak in, but besides questions regarding whether quantum mechanical indeterminacy can even have any affect on higher order constructions of matter, indeterminacy itself grants no free will, it simply grants randomness. To explain free will, we have to be able to explain how a person, with beliefs and desires and values can make a decision that is in some way intentionally willed, but yet in an indeterministic* way. In a way that is free in some metaphysical sense. The quantum indeterminacy of microparticles gives us no solace.
This was not an all out attack on free will, though I’m sure it comes off as one. Rather, it was a few very basic attacks on a poorly defined conception of free will. A thorough exploration of the topic would take a whole series of posts (which I plan on doing some time in the future). What I want to get across is that whether it’s a holdover from Freud, or whether it has to do with faulty conceptions of consciousness in the first place, we often try to defend free will while not actually talking about free will at all. This seems to permeate our thought on the subject. Dr. Klemm is almost certainly aware of the things I spoke about in this post. Given his background, he probably understands them better than me. But because he has started from a misguided assumption, his conclusions are also misguided. What is a “free” action? What is the nature of “intention”? Who or what is even the agent that has free will? If anything, psychology and neuroscience have dismantled standard conceptions of what a “self” really is, and whether that concept is itself a convenient fiction. Arguing that because decisions are made consciously is itself not a defense of free will, assuming one can be made.
*You could make an argument that free will is compatible with determinism. A tricky philosophical endeavor, one that some heavyweights have attempted to do, so for now I’ll just note that that the argument exists. Feel free (you like that one?) to drop the last six words of that sentence, in lieu of my not making a strong argument here for that point. Main point still stands…
22 Responses
10:05 pm
“Arguing that because decisions are made consciously is itself not a defense of free will.” I can agree with that and go one step further. I posit that in most human lifetimes there are maybe a handful of choices that are made purely on the basis of freewill. As a parent I have become acutely aware that free will is mostly myth. We are hardwired chemical animals reaching in vain for the fruit from the tree of knowledge. I think Eve only gave Adam one bite; just enough to have a few minor differences from the rest of the mammals: developed sense of humor, denial, and a sense of our own mortality. Otherwise, its just a matter of time before we can build a computer to predict every action we will take.
9:39 am
Interesting Max. What would you say are the situations where individuals make decisions truly on the basis of free will? What makes those situations different from others where we act simply on our biology?
4:55 pm
My background and expertise lie in the areas of physics and engineering although I do delve into the world of biology, psychology, anthropology, art and so forth from time to time.
Whatever the subject matter and whatever my reaction, emotion or explanation for an event may be, to me everything has to boil down to the fundamental laws of physics that Greg talks about in the second last paragraph.
There still is a long way to go in understanding these fundamental laws of matter, energy, forces etc, but in my opinion we have established enough ground for our current understanding of physics to be a strong starting point. For this reason I cannot accept free will.
I am also interested to hear what instances people may think that decisions are made on the basis of free will?
11:07 pm
Paolo, I think you’d be interested in reading a series of posts I’d like to eventually do on free will. It’s a complex subject, and not one that I can easily address in just one post.
*Spoiler Alert*
I reject the concept of free will. But I think to do that takes more than the argument from physics. So let me play a little devils advocate here. The idea implicit in your statement above is that higher order organizations of matter supervene on lower order ones. This is a strong position and one that is held by many in the cognitive sciences. It’s a position I held for many years as well. So mind supervenes on neurophysiology, neurophysiology can be explained by biology which can be explained by chemistry, which can be explained by physics. Consciousness is just an epiphenomena (along for the ride, no causal influence), and everything is really just particles interacting. The problem is that supervenience is based on a false assumption. The assumption is that the universe is made up of substances whose properties can be broken down into lower order substances, and so on. But science again and again tells us this is false. Every time we look deeper, we don’t find substances, but process. A molecule is defined by a process which we call atoms. Atoms are defined by a process which we call the interaction protons, neutrons, and electrons. And all the way down to quantum field theory which says everything is process.
Take the example of a candle flame. A candle flame is not a “thing”, a candle flame is a process, a temporally extended one. You cant describe a candle flame by the positions of various physical particles because a candle flame is defined by an ongoing flow of energy and material, into and out of the system. A candle flame IS that flow, that process. There is also no boundary condition that can be defined, no definite set of atoms or molecules that can be said to be part of flame, not part of flame. If mental states can be said to be a temporally extended process, which I would argue they are, they also cannot be simply described by a supervenience theory.
Think about it, you can’t describe the american economy with recourse to point particles, even if everything about the american economy follows the laws of physics. You can’t predict the emergence of DNA from the laws of physics. This idea of emergence is very important. If these higher order organizations of process can emerge from lower level ones, it is the higher order processes that must be our locus of evaluation. The lower order processes provide boundary conditions and intrinsic constraints, but cannot be said to define the higher order processes.
Again, in the end I argue against free will. But I think to do that comprehensively, we have to address it from a higher level.
6:01 am
My knowledge of philosophy and its terms are rather basic so I’m still trying to comprehend your response and look forward to future posts further explaining the subject.
In terms of the candle flame – I thought it was defined in physics as a plasma (fourth state of matter). By heating a gas the particles eventually ionize (lose come electrons) producing a stream of charged particles. So you get a body of high energy particles.
I have performed thermal imaging for the Surface Engineering Research Group here in UCD (Dublin, not Davis). They are carrying out some fantastic research and again my knowledge of plasma is rather basic as it’s not my primary field of research. However, from what I do know the plasma can form defined structures, flames have defined areas and gradients, both physically and thermodynamically.
While I see where your going with the idea of conciousness being a temporal process I’m not sure I’m convinced that it is analogous to a flame. In fact I’m sure I’ve considered processes on the most basic level to add anything more to the discussion at this stage. So you have certainly given me plenty of food for thought! 🙂
11:40 pm
hmmm…well, you know more about physics than me, so I’ll cede this particular point to you. Though I do still think the general point about the process and temporal flow stands. As well as the points about emergence. Anyway, I don’t want to get into it just yet, but I acknowledge that the case from physics is strong, and needs to be addressed (even though in the end I agree with you).
4:34 pm
I think the closest we can come to free will is to to be able to understand the reasons behind our actions.
4:52 pm
I tend to agree. I would go a step further and argue that to have any kind of just and positive society, it’s imperative that we understand these reasons. In the end I believe that whether we label something free will or not is sort of besides the point, when the real goal should be understanding the causes of human behavior. Whether someone in prison for armed robbery was truly free in their action is not what I’m concerned with. What I am concerned with is what are the causal factors that led to this person committing that act and what are steps we can take to help that person realize the error of their ways so to speak. Can we change the flow of the interactive pattern that is “them” to follow a more positive route? What are the kinds of systems we as a society can set up to direct the development of individuals towards positive goals. etc… If words and education aren’t enough, what are the ethics of more invasive measures?
I look at free will as sort of the red herring of ethics.
8:40 pm
Yes, in recent years, discussions about free will have placed to much weight on the issue of whether my brain makes decisions before I’m consciously aware of them. To me it feels as if it does, but so what? What’s consciousness got to do with my free will? Introspection indicates that my consciousness is an observer, a story teller, a modeler — not a homuncular director. I’m confident that consciousness serves a significantly adaptive role, but it doesn’t invent and choose. Pointing that out is no argument against free will.
1:26 am
I’ve been thinking about the idea of the adaptive role of consciousness for a while. It’s such a problematic concept that I’ve come to the conclusion that part of the problem is we simply don’t have a strong working definition for what the elements of conscious experience are that are even selected for. When we talk about evolutionary advantage of consciousness we normally are referring to some subset of what constitutes our conscious experience. Attention. Memory. Emotion. etc…but those can be explained mechanically, neuro-physiologically, what is it about a subjective experience that can be selected for? We don’t even have a model for how this occurs. Is it epiphenomenal? Evolutionary cheesecake? Or is there something else going on? I’d love to explore this when I have the time.
3:53 pm
“You could make an argument that free will is compatible with determinism. A tricky philosophical endeavor, one that some heavyweights have attempted to do, so for now I’ll just note that that the argument exists.”
I’m afraid you’re way off on this one. Compatibilism is by far the dominant view in the philosophy of action today.
4:09 pm
Whether it’s dominant or not is not my point. I point out that some “heavyweights” in philosophy espouse it, but since my post wasn’t really concerned with that side of the argument, but rather with this notion that free will lies in conscious decisions rather than unconscious ones, I leave it at that (I apologize if I didn’t label it as more popular than my sentence might imply). In fact, if you take a look at my most recent post about free will, you’ll see that whether free will exists or not is also not ultimately what I’m concerned with. What concerns me is a more accurate understanding of human behavior and how that should affect our actions and the systems we set up in society.
Thanks for checking out the blog though!
3:51 am
I truly hope I’m wrong here (my pessimism could skew my analysis), but here goes.
There are problems with adopting such a view. This doesn’t just affect free will in terms of “moral behavior”. It also affects how free our mind is to do anything. Including reasoning. It’s not just our “will” that is given to us by these forces what we can’t manipulate/change, it’s also our thoughts in general.
If all of our thoughts are made for us by things outside of our control, which are not free, then even the thoughts that you gave in this post were determined by these causes.
So there’s no reason for me to listen to your argument, or for you to listen to mine, thus making your/my argument null. The fact that I’m typing this wasn’t a rational decision, I was merely programmed to do so by forces which are outside of my control.
Reasoning therefore is useless because it’s all determined by causes outside of our control.
The only way out is to basically assume some sort of teleological behavior when it comes to our neurons, like it’s somehow directed on purpose to lead us to truth in most occasions. Otherwise, it’s like claiming that every single time we were right it was just due to pure chance. Too much pure chance, don’t you think?
You are arguing for non-reductive physicalism if I read one of the comments correctly. There’s arguments given against that, believe you me. Read some of Jaegwon Kim’s writings.
I’m not arguing against determinism necessarily. I’m just saying this specific type of determinism doesn’t really leave much room to reasoning.
It’s essentially like programming a computer with a specific algorithm to process information in a certain way. If the algorithm is correct, it will give out correct answers. If the algorithm is incorrect, incorrect answers. The computer won’t know either way. The computer (like us) can’t just change the algorithm that it uses. Just like we can’t change what happens in our brains (when we reason) before we become conscious of it.
I also don’t agree that with the person who said we’ll have a computer that can predict every single thing. It might be likely to do so on most occasions, but sometimes people can do something totally unexpected, totally random, something that has nothing to do with their personality up to that point, with what the “normal” or “expected” response in a situation is. Simply because they chose to do so. The first commenter makes far too bold claims considering we haven’t fully explained consciousness yet. Thus, we haven’t fully explained what it can and can’t do. And I also disagree that we are completely hardwired when neuroplasticity has shown that many things can be changed within the brain. Epigenetics shows that not all genes have to express and thus genes are not immutable.
Though a lack of free will definitely won’t help me with my depression, it won’t be as bad as thinking that even my reasoning is just an illusion. Nihilism of that sort leaves me even fewer reasons to wake up in the morning for.
There must be something we’re missing. Something that allows us to maintain rationality and tie it in with natural laws. Otherwise, it’s just a coincidence that the things going on inside my head led me to the truth, or anyone else for that matter.
P.S. I do appreciate the fact that you still allow for the possibility of free will somewhat (since we haven’t really done any true analysis on it and are just beginning to get there). Also, I don’t think you can blame people for trying to find free will in consciousness. I mean, if it DOES exist, I certainly can’t imagine a way in which the unconscious is more likely than the conscious to be free. At least consciousness give us this feeling of being in control. Though again, I understand why you are saying we shouldn’t assume consciousness has free will. It’s just that if free will exists, it’s probably thanks to consciousness.
3:24 am
Hi WaitingForDeath, thanks for commenting. I think I see you making a couple common mistakes that come up in the free will discussion. First though, it’s worth pointing out I don’t say free will doesn’t exist, I just argue against the idea that because decisions stem from conscious choices, that this makes them necessarily free. I do agree with you, that if we are to find free will and defend it, it has to be at the level of consciousness, at the level of persons (ontologically speaking). But we can’t assert it, we would have to defend this notion.
It’s also worth pointing out that we can still lack free will in an indeterministic universe. In fact, above, when you talk about randomness, I’d say that chaos theory and quantum mechanics, and their affect on the functioning of systems (and thus biological organisms) would lead to more randomness than a deterministic philosophy. There is nothing random or chancy about determinism…but I don’t think arguing for determinism actually gets us anything definitive in the free will debate. But yes, I do find the idea of an uncaused action, of any sort, nonsensical. What would that even mean at the level of an organism? How can you have a “free” neuronal process? But I don’t know why this leads you to the idea that reasoning is useless? Let’s not confuse the subjective experience of reasoning, with the causal efficacy of the process that underlies reasoning (which can be very valuable, even if not free). Similarly, lack of free will does not at all preclude learning, and error guided behavior, and all the other wonderful things that can come from our synaptic plasticity. Learning still follows rules. Synaptic change follows rules. Think about the myriad of conditioning experiments. Determinism or lack of free will != hardwired or incapable of change.
I cover some relevant issues to this conversation in this post: http://cognitivephilosophy.net/consciousness/what-we-miss-in-the-free-will-debate/. I think the free will debate is largely a red herring. It doesn’t provide anything useful in my mind. To me, what is important is understanding the causes of human behavior, and understanding how synaptic change can lead to behavioral changes and changes in thought patterns, and how that information can be integrated in a system of ethics.
Oh, also, in regards to Kim, I find it odd you would suggest him. Since he argues completely against the idea of free will. He thinks consciousness and mental states have no causal efficacy in the world, all the causal efficacy for him lies in the base level of physical matter. Consciousness is just along for the ride. I don’t like to take sides in the reductive vs. non-reductive physicalism, partly because I think it greatly depends on how you define reduction, but also because in so far as physicalism precludes a process metaphysics, I don’t know that I could call myself a physicalist. Again, definitions are tricky.
12:01 pm
“I just argue against the idea that because decisions stem from conscious choices, that this makes them necessarily free.”
Actually, it does. If actions are not free, they are not choices or decisions, but reactions. Along that line, I’d be interested if you could give (or point out where you have previously given) your working definitions of choice/decision, free will (since you argue that common definitions are incorrect), determinism and indeterminism.
The last two are of interest to me because many sources in this area use them to set up a false dichotomy: all actions are either completely pre-determined (determinacy) or completely random (indeterminacy).
Thanks, and keep up the deep thought!
1:14 am
Hey Jason, thanks for the feedback. It seems to me that you’re failing to make a distinction though. If free will exists, it lies in our ability to consciously choose and make decisions. I’m not arguing against that. But the mere fact that something is chosen consciously does not necessarily make it free. At least it’s not clear to me why it would be without some sort of supporting argument. The article I responded to was making the same conflation. It was saying that simply by being conscious, choices are free. My post above used a series of examples that I believe are problematic when arguing for a strict identify relationship between conscious choices and free will. A lot of moral psychology in recent years has also forced us to realize the situation and context sensitive nature of much of human behavior, also threatening a strict relation between conscious choice and free will.
I doubt I have given working definitions on this blog of the terms you ask for. If I said that “common definitions” of free will are incorrect, i misspoke. A more accurate way of putting it would be that common conceptions of free will are problematic. And it’s precisely because there doesn’t seem to be a great working definition of free will, because it is so tied up in historical dualistic/religious notions.
A “choice” would be the selecting of an action from a set of possible actions, or something akin to that. I’ve never seen indeterminacy spelled out as “completely random” though. It’s usually fleshed out as “not determinable,” but all that necessitates is that some aspect of the decision making/acting process is random (quantum indeterminacy at the micro level), and so actions at the macro level are not determinate. But what is the middle way between determinacy and indeterminacy that you think should be considered?
7:48 am
“But the mere fact that something is chosen consciously does not necessarily make it free. At least it’s not clear to me why it would be without some sort of supporting argument.”
Again, by definition. If a choice is not free, then it is not a choice, but a reaction. Certainly, choices may be influenced–and in fact, all choices are. But so long as we retain the capacity to choose against prior influences, we have free will. Which is not to say that all people EXERCISE free will, and especially not at all times. But the capacity for choice exists, thus free will.
“But what is the middle way between determinacy and indeterminacy that you think should be considered?”
I admit, the only site I could find which offered clear definitions of the concepts under discussion was Wikipedia, and I am strongly of the opinion that no meaningful discussion can be had about concepts which are not clearly defined. So, to further the discussion, I stooped to using the Wiki. Ick.
Actually, I see four possibilities here:
1) All events are determined by prior events.
2) All events are random.
3) All events are influenced by prior events, but not wholly determined.
4) Events may be the result of prior events or the action of contemporary causal agents.
The first two are actually ruled out by quantum mechanics: since a quantum body may be found at any point along its wave function, and all bodies are quantum bodies, #1 is definitely not true. However, since quantum wave functions have (very strong, at the macro level) probability densities, #2 is also not true. This leave the question of whether physcial probability determines all, or whether there are non-physical, acting causal agents (consciousnesses) in the universe.
I believe that it is a fallacy to attempt to apply scientific methodology to this problem–science by definition is about the measurement of physical phenomena. Much as with “God” and the number “one”, “consciousness” (being metaphysical) cannot be the subject of an hypothesis. It must be accepted or rejected as an axiom.
Since an argument invoking God would likely too controversial to be useful here, allow me to illustrate with the number “one”. “One” does not consist of any form of matter or energy; it is entirely metaphysical in nature. However, it can definitely be said positively to exist, since by accepting it as an axiom we gain access to mathematics, which accurately and elegantly can describe every operation so far observed in the universe (sorry, reductionist materialism). From mathematics, we derive science, and from science we derive technology, so the evidence for the existence of the metaphysical “one” is all around us.
Note, however, that there is no scientific test which can be performed to prove the existence of “one”; it is self-referential and can only be proved after having already accepted its existence. Consciousness may be viewed similarly: a self-referential metaphysical agent. If you do not accept consciousness as an axiom, you can never find it. Note also that consciousness is by definition independently causal (possessing free will). Without the ability to cause, consciousness is meaningless and thus non-existent.
2:46 pm
“Again, by definition. If a choice is not free, then it is not a choice, but a reaction.”
Again, it’s not clear to me what definition you are using, or why I should be forced to accept it. Free in what sense? Free from physical impediment? Free from mental impediment? Do you make a distinction between an action that is free and an action that stems from free will? What is your definitions of free will? Do you make a distinction between will and free will? Is this your definition of free will: “so long as we retain the capacity to choose against prior influences, we have free will”? So your definition of free will just seems to be a label put on the following: the capacity of an agent, given their prior influences, to contemplate a set of actions and choose one among them. I’m not even terribly opposed to that definition. The problem is that the concept of free will is laden with so many historical and religious landmines, that a simple redefinition like that, and incorporation into our interactions and justice system, etc…seems like it could be harmful without the appropriate contextual issues brought to light on a national level. But even then, even accepting that. So what? As I’ve pointed out, I have a very pragmatic/functional view on these issues. Now that we have this label of free will that we can bestow on actions that meet the above criteria, so what? What role does that concept play in human interaction. That’s what I’m ultimately concerned with.
“Without the ability to cause, consciousness is meaningless and thus non-existent.”
As I mentioned in another response to you, I do think consciousness has causal influence, but you certainly haven’t provided an argument to show that consciousness couldn’t exist unless it was casual. Epiphenomenalism isn’t logically incoherent (depending on your metaphysical assumptions). But second, being causal doesn’t make it free. Protons and electrons and atoms and molecules and fires and hurricanes lightning all have causal influence in the universe, they don’t have free will.
5:26 pm
” I should be forced to accept it. ”
You’re not. I’ve asked several times for you to provide definitions. 🙂
“Free in what sense?”
Well, physical impediment does doesn’t really apply to will; it may limit choices, but in itself would not prevent me from freely choosing among the remaining options I perceive. Actually, there is no “impediment” which applies to free will. Either I have it, and am capable of choosing my actions, or I do not have it, and my actions are simply the inevitable result of previous conditions.
” Do you make a distinction between an action that is free and an action that stems from free will?”
No. There are no free actions without free will.
“What is your definitions of free will?”
The ability of a consciousness to choose its own actions. Not only in an immediate sense, as in taking a left turn instead of a right, but in the sense of shaping its
7:03 pm
I did provide a definition of choice above, “A “choice” would be the selecting of an action from a set of possible actions, or something akin to that.” That doesn’t hold any metaphysical commitments to free will in my book. All it requires is that an agent can engage in action selection. But for you, the definition is such that it’s not even a choice if free will doesn’t exist. And your defense of free will so far has been a recourse to the independent causality of consciousness, which itself has not been given an independent defense, you’ve just asserted your definition and claimed it’s a meaningless concept otherwise. You have certain metaphysical commitments, and you have defined your terms in light of them. But these commitments are not established fact, and so it seems somewhat futile to attempt to convince me of the rightness of your definitions without providing a defense of the root claim.
I vehemently disagree with the idea that consciousness can be independently causal though. I’m guessing you have some dualistic conception of mind, or even more likely, the idealist one you discussed earlier, but it’ll be nigh on impossible for you to convince me of the validity of that position. It’s not clear to me that we can have meaningful conversation about these concepts and their definitions given that.
Or, well, it’s not all doom and gloom. I’ve said multiple times that I can agree with certain positions of yours. I agree that *if* we have the capacity for free will, we don’t necessarily exercise it all the time, as you mention with your examples. But we do have some fundamentally different metaphysical commitments, and in the how am I not myself post I laid out at least some ways in which consciousness is not independently causal, given its emergence from our embodied interaction.
5:54 pm
own destiny (like an alcoholic who decides, on his own recognisance, to dedicate himself to being sober despite both the addiction and habit of alcohol). Free will is being independantly causal.
“Do you make a distinction between will and free will? ”
Yes. An animal gnawing its leg off to get free from a trap is demonstrating will. However, lacking a self-aware consciousness, that will can only be directed by instinct and is thus not free.
“but you certainly haven’t provided an argument to show that consciousness couldn’t exist unless it was casual.”
We’re going back to definition. If it isn’t causal, it isn’t consciousness; it’s a delusion without a subject.
“Protons and electrons and atoms and molecules and fires and hurricanes lightning all have causal influence in the universe, they don’t have free will.”
I stuck this in once above, and then dropped it because I thought once mentioned, it was obvious. Consciousness is INDEPENDENTLY causal. That is why will with consciousness is free. Hurricanes and fires aren’t independently causal; they are simply the effects of previously-existing conditions, and cannot determine their own courses. A consciousness, exercising free will, can determine it’s own course regardless of prior conditions.
6:13 pm
Restatement: it is not possible to take a free action without free will (since all actions will be determined by previous conditions). However, it is possible to have the capacity for free will and not exercise it (acting on reflex, instinct, habit or addiction).